Posted by:
Henry Bemis
(
)
Date: June 25, 2020 05:31PM
That's just it. It's not rational.
It is the inverse to rational inquiry. That's why it's called "faith."
COMMENT: Not so! Religious faith can be rational or irrational. It is rational when one draws conclusions by making rational inferences from one's experiences and/or the experiences of others. This is precisely what scientists do. The fact that one's experiences are "spiritual" or unusual is not sufficient of itself to conclude that any conclusions drawn from such experiences are themselves necessarily irrational--even though, of course, they may be false.
Here are a couple of quotes that might help you appreciate this perspective:
In his book, Making Waves, Nobel laureate, and Christian, Charles Townes, wrote:
“The essential role of faith in religion is so well known that it is usually taken as characteristic of religion, and as distinguishing religion from science. But faith is essential to science too, although we do not so generally recognize the basic need and nature of faith in science.”
“Faith is necessary for the scientist to even get started, and deep faith necessary for him to carry out his tougher tasks. Why? Because he must be personally committed to the belief that there is order in the universe and that the human mind -- in fact his own mind -- has a good chance of understanding this order. Without this belief, there would be little point in intense effort to try to understand a presumably disorderly or incomprehensible world.”
A religious person might well say something similar; just as faith in a natural order, and human cognition is necessary for science to get off the ground; faith in God is a necessary experiences of "God." In both cases confirming experiences follow. (Presumably!)
In William James’ essay, “The Will to Believe” he considers religious faith as a choice, with both the decision of faith and the decision of skepticism involving risk:
"[R]eligion offers itself as a *momentous* option. We are supposed to gain, even now, by our belief, and to lose by our non-belief, a certain vital good. Secondly, religion is a *forced* option, so far as that goes. We cannot escape the issue by remaining sceptical and waiting for more light, because, although we do avoid error in that way *if religion be untrue,* we lose the goods, *if it be true,* just as certainly as if we positively chose to disbelieve. It is as if a man should hesitate indefinitely to ask a certain woman to marry him because he was not perfectly sure that she would prove an angel after he brought her home. Would he not cut himself off from that particular angel-possibility as decisively as if he went and married someone else. Scepticism, then, is not avoidance of option; it is option of a certain particular kind of risk. *Better risk loss of truth than chance of error,* --that is your faith vetoer's exact position. He is actively playing his stake as much as the believer is; he is backing the field against the religious hypothesis, just as the believer is backing the religious hypothesis against the field. To preach skepticism to us as a duty until 'sufficient evidence' for religion be found, is tantamount therefore to telling us, when in presence of the religious hypothesis, that to yield to our fear of its being error is wiser and better than to yield to our hope that it may be true. It is not intellect against all passions, then; it is only intellect with one passion laying down the law. . . I, for one, can see no proof; and I simply refuse obedience to the scientist's command to imitate his kind of option, in a case where my own stake is important enough to give me the right to choose my own form of risk.
When people point to their spiritual experiences as the rationality behind their faith, they are generally articulating a "good" that is available with religious faith; a good that is missed by those of us who reject such faith. According to James, we can decide to accept or reject such faith (For the record, I reject it) but if we reject it, we are deciding that whatever good it might offer, such good is offset by the risk that such faith is misplaced.
This is a rational form of Pascal's wager, and it applies to bare faith in God, presumably when based upon human "spiritual" experiences and rational inferences drawn from them.