From the Aug 25 WSJ, this fascinating article on how the Taliban's economic policies advanced their political power, all undergirded by high-demand religious practices. The article mentions LDS, showing that highly conspicuous religious conformity reinforces obedience and identifies loyal followers who can be groomed for leadership.

To condense the article, and respect the WSJ's copyright, I have edited it (...) to those sections that are especially germane to LDS. As you read it, think: "Brigham Young, with keen despotic instincts, in a large semi-arid geography, governing a struggling people, seeking to consolidate his power and unify them, contesting against a powerful external adversary, developing high-demand religious practices."

I interjected a few remarks as "-Ed."

* * * * *

...How could a ragtag group of religious fundamentalists be so effective in capturing a territory that has resisted rule by some of the most formidable world powers?

An answer can be found in a quirky academic subfield known as the political economy of religion. It was developed in the late 1980s by sociologists Rodney Stark and Roger Finke and economist Laurence Iannaccone...

An insight from Mr. Iannaccone bears directly on the success of the Taliban: Groups with strict behavioral rituals are especially effective at organizing collective action. He was intrigued by the organizational vibrancy of some of the strictest faiths in the U.S., including Mormons, Jehovah’s Witnesses and Orthodox Jews [and Amish (-Ed.)] These groups all have demanding behavioral codes and intensely devoted adherents.

Mr. Iannaccone argued that behavioral codes like a prohibition on alcohol and stigmatizing behavior like wearing distinctive clothing enhanced cooperation. Religious organizations are “club goods,” wherein members share many collective benefits such as welfare provision and fellowship. Those benefits depend on active contribution. If everyone participates willingly, the organization is vibrant...

To limit free riding, strict religious groups require members to prove their loyalty [and obedience (-Ed)] via costly and visible behavior that deters the lazy [and non-believing (-Ed.)], such as going on two-year missions or memorizing holy texts. Such “sacrificial signaling” can be seen in other groups, such as fraternities and street gangs with strange hazing rituals.

Stigmatizing behavior also limits the outside opportunities of group members and binds (believers) more closely to the organization. Members find it difficult to betray the group because they have few alternative social options.

Economist Eli Berman used Mr. Iannaccone’s insight to study terrorist and rebel organizations. In his 2009 book “Radical, Religious and Violent,” Mr. Berman explained that operating a rebel group requires a high degree of loyal cooperation...

Linking a strict religious sect to a radical rebel group is an effective way of enhancing loyalty and cooperation. People who keep strict dietary habits, pray publicly several times a day, write poetry, and study religious texts to the exclusion of other activities make good cooperators.

The Taliban are an excellent example of Mr. Berman’s thesis. Their fundamentalist version of Sunni Islam imposes strict requirements on all members. It is easy for them to identify and choose leaders who are the most cooperative and know that they can be trusted [to obey and (-ed)] not to defect. As a result, they have become a disciplined organization wherein leaders and lower-level militants are unlikely to defect from the group’s mission of creating an Islamic state.

That explained their rise to power in Afghanistan in the 1990s. Following the withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1989, Afghanistan collapsed into a disorganized mess of rival clans vying for political and economic power. A disunited governing system couldn’t effectively collect taxes. The nation’s infrastructure, including the ability to guarantee basic market interactions, fell into disrepair.

The Taliban was the only unifying entity that could guarantee safe trade routes, collect taxes without excessively plundering the population, and provide essential public goods to key cities. They did this initially by securing control of the Kandahar-Herat Highway, an important trade route between Pakistan and Iran. Previously, competing tribal organizations dominated sections of this highway, stopped all transit, and excessively taxed truckers. With many different clans extracting money every few miles, it became too expensive to transport goods along this road, and commerce ground to a halt.

The Taliban eventually stationed militants at key locations on the highway and taxed merchants only once while protecting truckers from other bandits. Since devout Taliban members proved their loyalty via adherence to strict religious codes, the]y were unlikely to plunder the trucking caravans further, allowing commercial transport to resume.

[Compare to "the Kingdom of Deseret" and its position vz. trans-continental traffic and trade.

Successfully securing this road, the Taliban collected tolerable taxes they used for infrastructure projects throughout the country. The Taliban became reasonably popular. Afghans might not have liked their repressive religious policies, but at least the roads were open and the electricity came back.

[People will sacrifice their autonomy (liberty) in exchange for stability and safety. --Ed.]

The Taliban also proved to be reasonably fair arbitrators of civil justice, as imams adjudicated contract disputes between merchants. If people trust that property rights can be fairly enforced, they are more likely to make long-term investments that promote economic growth...
All this was possible because the Taliban are a strict religious movement in which leaders and members prove their loyalty by adhering to strict behavioral requirements. The secular government lacked this advantage. Little wonder that when the Taliban rolled into a town, the local population usually put up little resistance. For many Afghans, the strict and predictable implementation of Shariah is preferable to the arbitrary and kleptocratic rule that Afghans have endured for two decades...

[Brutal enforcement surely helped. (-Ed.)]

Despite the seeming irrelevance of religion in the secular West, policy makers and military strategists would do well to understand its power elsewhere in the world.

Mr. Gill is a professor of political science at the University of Washington and author of “The Political Origins of Religious Liberty” (Cambridge University Press).



Edited 1 time(s). Last edit at 08/28/2021 11:09PM by caffiend.

Is the WSJ publishing nonsense like this now? What it says is true on the margin but it has no foundation in Afghan history and completely misses the key to the Taliban's success. The critical paragraph is this one:

> That explained their rise to power in Afghanistan
> in the 1990s. Following the withdrawal of Soviet
> forces in 1989, Afghanistan collapsed into a
> disorganized mess of rival clans vying for
> political and economic power. A disunited
> governing system couldn’t effectively collect
> taxes. The nation’s infrastructure, including
> the ability to guarantee basic market
> interactions, fell into disrepair.

Why did "Afghanistan collapse into a disorganized mess of rival clans vying for. . . power?" Because that is what the country had been for centuries. The topography and poverty of the country divided it into five or six long-standing clans, some Pashtun (the continuum spanning the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan) and other various Turkic or Iranian groups. They historically met periodically for loya jurga councils and effectively agreed on a series of temporary central governments that were far too weak to control the whole country. The system worked by maintaining a fragile balance between regional powers.

It was *not* the Taliban's cultic organization that changed that. If it had been--and this is important--then why didn't the Mujahadeen, which was much the same in doctrinal and behavioral terms, not manage to unite the country?

The answer is that the Taliban had an exceptionally powerful external ally. In the 1980s Pakistan decided that it needed a stable Afghanistan to fall back into in the event of war with India. So Islamabad organized the Taliban in Pashtun communities in Pakistan and then used the common language, common Deobandi Islamic tendencies, familial and tribal ties, and Soviet-era arms routes to establish the Taliban in the Pashtun regions of Afghanistan. Then Pakistan provided money (with additional support from Saudi Arabi), weapons, intelligence, and diplomatic assistance as the Taliban moved north and east and nearly gained control of the whole country.

To put the point bluntly, the Taliban is a Pakistani creation and succeeded in gaining dominance because of Pakistani support. That is why it was able to do what the Mujahadeen had not.

It is also why the US-created government collapsed so fast. Washington gave the government enough support to sustain it but did not break down the barriers between the various tribes and their regions. So when Trump and Biden cut off American support, it was perfectly natural for the tribal cheftains who were serving as government ministers to retreat to their tribes and negotiate with the other tribes and particularly the most powerful, if artificial, tribe, the Taliban, in order to save their own lives and those of their followers. What we have seen over the last month, in short, is exactly what one would have expected.

Did the Taliban's cult structure help unite the country? No, it did not. It helped in the Pashtun regions, to be sure, but Deobandi Islam has not put down deep roots in the other tribal regions. They key to Taliban power was brute force, force delivered by Pakistani weaponry.

The WSJ's religious analysis would be more persuasive if it did not attempt to turn a peripheral factor--cult organization and behavior--into the main story. That is way off the mark. As in most historical cases, power emerged from the barrel of a gun.



Edited 5 time(s). Last edit at 08/29/2021 04:36AM by Lot's Wife.

Lots' Wife <deep bow>

The Great Game continues

You see what happens when a person reads a good history book? He ends up understanding the geopolitics of a place and can understand when history repeats itself a century or more later.

Yes. Alexander wanted to control Afghanistan to secure his flank against India; Britain, already controlling that country, wanted Afghanistan to prevent invasion. In both cases Afghanistan was seen as necessary in subcontinental terms. Now that India is split, northern India (Pakistan) needs Afghanistan as a counterpoise to southern India (India). The country's geographic location makes it essential to regional stability.

"The Great Game continues."

Pretty bold of WSJ to link the Taliban to Mormonism…


I kind of like it.

There has never been a time in Mormon history when the church exercised anywhere near as much power over the people within its territories as the Taliban does. The worst excesses of Mormonism occur many times each day and with no attempts at coverup or justification in Afghanistan.

The comparison is misleading.