Posted by:
Gay Philosopher
(
)
Date: November 14, 2013 12:21AM
Hi,
I suspect that every writer would like to influence lots of readers. However, most philosophers generally write for a specialty audience that's very, very small. If you're lucky, a few hundred individuals might read your journal publication, world-wide.
Einstein wanted to know the "mind" of "God." That's what he explored through theoretical physics. I feel the same way. For me, philosophy is akin to a religious pursuit. I want to understand the nature of the world, and the limits of what I can and can't know. I want to be able to reason better, use terms more precisely, and be able to juggle ideas in such a manner as to be able to solve real-world problems, or if not that, then come closer to solving them.
Most of what counts as philosophy sits somewhere between hard-core logic and literature. Here are some recent (mostly philosophy, with a few related) journal publications and their abstracts:
Potochnik, Angela, and Brian McGill. "The Limitations of Hierarchical Organization." Philosophy Of Science 79, no. 1 (January 2012): 120-140. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed November 13, 2013).
The concept of levels of organization is prominent in science and central to a variety of debates in philosophy of science. Yet many difficulties plague the concept of universal and discrete hierarchical levels, and these undermine implications commonly ascribed to hierarchical organization. We suggest the concept of scale as a promising alternative. Investigating causal processes at different scales allows for a notion of quasi levels that avoids the difficulties inherent in the classic concept of levels. Our primary focus is ecology, but we suggest how the results generalize to other invocations of hierarchy in science and philosophy of science.
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Ihde, Don. "Can Continental Philosophy Deal with the New Technologies?." Journal Of Speculative Philosophy 26, no. 2 (May 2012): 321-332. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed November 13, 2013).
The article discusses the history of U.S. Continental philosophy in the context of the academic organization Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (SPEP), focusing on reflection on technology in relation to philosophy of science. The thought of philosophers including Martin Heidegger and Herbert Marcuse on technology is noted.
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Thomasson, Amie L. 2012. "EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE METHODS OF ONTOLOGY." Monist 95, no. 2: 175-199. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed November 13, 2013).
The article discusses methods in ontology and modal questions, weighing the relative merits of experimental philosophy and conceptual analysis. The author argues that a constitutivist approach, which uses thought experiments and ties semantic rules to modal realities, should be used alongside experimental philosophy.
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Nason, Shannon. "Contingency, Necessity, and Causation in Kierkegaard's Theory of Change." British Journal For The History Of Philosophy 20, no. 1 (January 2012): 141-162. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed November 13, 2013).
In this paper I argue that Kierkegaard's theory of change is motivated by a robust notion of contingency. His view of contingency is sharply juxtaposed with a strong notion of absolute necessity. I show that how he understands these notions explains certain ambiguous claims he makes about causation. I attempt to provide a coherent interpretation of his view of causality that is consistent with both human choice and the causal sequence of change. I end by suggesting a compatibilist interpretation of Kierkegaard's philosophy.
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ROSS, STEVEN. "THE NATURAL AND THE NORMATIVE: SUPERVENIENCE AND COUNTERFACTUALS." Philosophical Forum 43, no. 2 (Summer2012 2012): 197-214. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed November 13, 2013).
The author discusses the philosophical interpretation of cruelty and artistic expression through the idea of supervenience, which the author interprets as causation. The author describes normative states versus natural states, aesthetics, and moral life. The author uses examples to illustrate his philosophy such as analyzing a painting by artist William De Kooning and discussing the thermodynamics of water.
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Keizer, Henk. 2012. "Spinoza's Definition Of Attribute: An Interpretation." British Journal For The History Of Philosophy 20, no. 3: 479-498. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed November 13, 2013).
Since it has generally been accepted that to Spinoza attributes are real features of substance, the interpretation of his attribute definition has become a notorious problem. The reason is that interpreters have failed to see that the definition formulates a purely epistemological account of the state of affairs. The article presents and justifies such an interpretation. It will be shown that the definition in spite of its epistemological character implies a real ontological definition, which specifies the critical features of an attribute. As to the reason why Spinoza has stated the definition in an ‘indirect way’, it is shown that it is likely that he has done so in order to have a more efficient, a more unambiguous and a more elegant definition. The relevance of the new interpretation is not only that it provides us with an interpretable, transparent attribute definition, but it also contributes to the establishment of a coherent picture of Spinoza’s metaphysics around this definition.
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O'Connor, Brian. "Idleness, Usefulness and Self-Constitution." Critical Horizons 14, no. 2 (June 2013): 181-199. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed November 13, 2013).
The core argument of the paper is that the modern philosophical notion of self-constitution is directed against the prospect of human beings dissolving into idleness. Arguments for self-constitution are marked by non-philosophical presuppositions about the value of usefulness. Those arguments also assume a particular conception of superior experience as conscious integration of a person's actions within an identifiable set of chosen commitments. Exploring particular arguments by Hegel, Kant, Korsgaard and Frankfurt the paper claims that those arguments are problematic in the various ways in which they suppose usefulness and explicitly or implicitly take extra-philosophical views of idleness.
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Smith, Michael. "FOUR OBJECTIONS TO THE STANDARD STORY OF ACTION (AND FOUR REPLIES)." Philosophical Issues 22, no. 1 (October 2012): 387-401. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed November 13, 2013).
The article presents authors views on the objections to the theory of action of an agent. It informs that the identification of some putative action that an agent performs by tracing its effects back to some bodily movement has a great impact on a person. It further informs that one must stuck to the standard theory of action.
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Rauti, Antonio. 2012. "Multiple Groundings and Deference." Philosophical Quarterly 62, no. 247: 317-336. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed November 13, 2013).
The idea that reference is multiply grounded allows causal-historical theories of reference to account for reference change. It also threatens the stability of reference in light of widespread error and confusion. I describe the problem, so far unrecognised, and provide a solution based on the phenomenon of semantic deference, which I differentiate from reference-borrowing. I conclude that deference has an authentic foundational semantic role to play.
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Aldama, Frederick Luis, and Patrick Colm Hogan. "Puzzling Out the Self: Some Initial Reflections." English Language Notes 49, no. 2 (Winter2011 2011): 139-160. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed November 13, 2013).
An essay is presented which discusses the concept of the self, with particular focus given to philosophical and scientific approaches to defining and understanding the self. Cognitive science and neurobiological investigations into the self are described, and phenomena including mirror neurons, evolution, and adaptation are examined. Also discussed are the concept of self in the Vedāntic tradition, reductionism, Marxist ideas of individualism, and the relationship between social life and biology. The construction of identity is also touched on.
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Baynes, Kenneth. "SELF, NARRATIVE AND SELF-CONSTITUTION: REVISITING TAYLOR'S 'SELF-INTERPRETING ANIMALS' KENNETH BAYNES SELF, NARRATIVE, AND SELF-CONSTITUTION." Philosophical Forum 41, no. 4 (Winter2010 2010): 441-457. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed November 13, 2013).
The article offers the author's insights on the thesis of Charles Taylor that humans are self-interpreting animals. The author explores the significance of the theses if Taylor in which he says that the thesis proposed an account of describing oneself as expressivist and describe humans as strong evaluators. He says that the thesis of Taylor that humans are self-interpreting animals can also be incorrect sometimes and focuses on autobiographical self.
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Buss, Sarah. 2012. "Autonomous Action: Self-Determination in the Passive Mode." Ethics 122, no. 4: 647-691. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed November 13, 2013).
In order to be a self-governing agent, a person must govern the process by means of which she acquires the intention to act as she does. But what does governing this process require? The standard compatibilist answers to this question all assume that autonomous actions differ from nonautonomous actions insofar as they are a more perfect expression of the agent's agency. I challenge this conception of autonomous agents as super agents. The distinguishing feature of autonomous agents is, I argue, the nonagential role they play in the formation of their intentions. I offer an account of the relevant role.
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Lewis, William S. "Evolutionary Psychology in the Service of Moral Philosophy: A Possible Future for Ethics?." Journal Of Speculative Philosophy 25, no. 1 (February 2011): 48-63. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed November 14, 2013).
The article explores on Ethics as a discipline in learning the evolutionary moral psychology in line with the future of Ethics. According to the author, Ethics does have much to learn in line with its sciences that study the evolutionary mechanisms by which ethical judgment develops. Moreover, evolutionary moral psychology suggests that innate moral sentiment provides input on tendencies on ethical practices.
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FISCHER, EUGEN. "HOW TO PRACTISE PHILOSOPHY AS THERAPY: PHILOSOPHICAL THERAPY AND THERAPEUTIC PHILOSOPHY." Metaphilosophy 42, no. 1/2 (January 2011): 49-82. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed November 14, 2013).
The notion that philosophy can be practised as a kind of therapy has become a focus of debate. This article explores how philosophy can be practised literally as a kind of therapy, in two very different ways: as philosophical therapy that addresses 'real-life problems' (e.g., Sextus Empiricus) and as therapeutic philosophy that meets a need for therapy which arises in and from philosophical reflection (e.g., Wittgenstein). With the help of concepts adapted from cognitive and clinical psychology, and from cognitive linguistics, the article shows that both philosophical projects address important and literally therapeutic tasks and explains how they can do so with genuinely philosophical argument and analysis. This brings into view new applications for philosophy, a need for therapy in core areas of the subject, and the outline of a new approach to meet what will be shown to be a central need.
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HANNA, JASON. 2012. "The Moral Status of Nonresponsible Threats." Journal Of Applied Philosophy 29, no. 1: 19-32. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed November 14, 2013).
Most people believe that it is permissible to kill a nonresponsible threat, or someone who threatens one's life without exercising agency. Defenders of this view must show that there is a morally relevant difference between nonresponsible threats and innocent bystanders. Some philosophers, including Jonathan Quong and Helen Frowe, have attempted to do this by arguing that one who kills a bystander takes advantage of another person, while one who kills a threat does not. In this paper, I show that the proposals offered by Quong and Frowe have unacceptable implications. I then argue that those who claim that nonresponsible threats may be killed face a dilemma generated by the possibility of a stationary threat, or someone who endangers another person's life without moving. Unless we arbitrarily distinguish between stationary and moving nonresponsible threats, it is unclear how the permission to kill nonresponsible threats is to be explicated. I conclude that nonresponsible threats are not legitimate targets of self-defense.
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Bertelsen, Preben. "General psychological principles in Kohut's self psychology.." Journal Of Phenomenological Psychology 27, no. 2 (Fall96 1996): 146. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed November 14, 2013).
Examines how a general psychological model of intentional reflection can be developed on the basis of H. Kohut's self psychology, a model that illustrates one of the central organizational principles of human psychology. What self psychology is; How it differs from Freudian psychoanalysis; Its relationship to the phenomenological-existential perspective.
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Rowe, Christopher. "Socrates on Reason, Appetite and Passion: A Response to Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith, Socratic Moral Psychology." Journal Of Ethics 16, no. 3 (September 2012): 305-324. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed November 14, 2013).
Section 1 of this essay distinguishes between four interpretations of Socratic intellectualism, which are, very roughly: (1) a version in which on any given occasion desire, and then action, is determined by what we think will turn out best for us, that being what we all, always, really desire; (2) a version in which on any given occasion action is determined by what we think will best satisfy our permanent desire for what is really best for us; (3) a version formed by the assimilation of (2) to (1), labelled the 'standard' version' by Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith, and treated by them as a single alternative to their own interpretation; and (4) Brickhouse and Smith's own version. Section 2 considers, in particular, Brickhouse and Smith's handling of the 'appetites and passions', which is the most distinctive feature of interpretation (4). Section 3 discusses Brickhouse and Smith's defence of 'Socratic studies' in its historical context, and assesses the contribution made by their distinctive interpretation of 'the philosophy of Socrates'. One question raised in this section, and one that is clearly fundamental to the existence of 'Socratic studies', is how different Brickhouse and Smith's Socrates turns out to be from Plato himself, i.e., the Plato of the post-'Socratic' dialogues; to which the answer offered is that on Brickhouse and Smith's interpretation Socratic moral psychology becomes rather less distinguishable from its 'Platonic' counterpart-as that is currently understood-than it is on the interpretation(s) they oppose.
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I wanted to give everyone a sense for what's out there, and to show that it would be difficult for a non-specialist to just start reading and be able to understand an article. This is true for different sorts of philosophers, too. Just as an oncologist wouldn't be able to perform an orthopedic surgery, an action theorist (philosopher) wouldn't necessarily be able to keep up with the certain methodological innovations in epistemology. As you can also tell, it really does take a lifetime, and lots of very hard work, to be able to write articles such as these.
There's a difference between Plato (and ancient philosophy, which is studied extensively today) and a modern analytic philosopher. There's more logic and less wisdom, you could say. The topics considered are truly fascinating. If you truly want to get to the bottom of a particular problem that you're highly interested in, philosophy is the only way to get there, and it will take huge sacrifices. Again, I recall Einstein. In today's world, which encourages the unbridled support of riches, the truly "religious" seem to be those who dedicate their lives to research--to understanding.
It's useful to read through some of the abstracts, above, and ask: Who is more intelligent--this philosopher, or the Prophet(tm)? What's more useful--a false story from a plagiarized book, or a treatise on evolutionary psychology and moral theory?
When you see the world's knowledge--the knowledge encapsulated in the minds of the world's greatest thinkers, and expressed through their publications--the fraud of something like Mormonism becomes immediately evident.
As I once said to--of all things--a creationist chemistry professor a dozen years ago: "'God' is way too big for your little book."
I hope that the articles I cited above support that.
Steve