To a very sincere and interesting post by Brian M about Group Selection and Mormonism's appeal to the "Pure in Heart", Henry Bemis strongly recommended a Professor (and prominent ID critic) not only to Brian M but to "all the other social-psychology-minded people on the board:"

http://exmormon.org/phorum/read.php?2,486001,486782#msg-486782

Specifically, Bemis goes after the abuses of Evolution and Sociobiology:

"Unfortunately, this misunderstanding [of evolutionary selection and sociobiology] is shared by several other psychologists and psychology-oriented commentators on this board… Moreover, it is shared by many prominent psychology theorists, who often attempt to apply evolutionary biology in a casual, non-rigorous, knee-jerk fashion to pet psychological theories, without really understanding what they are talking about."

I think Bemis is right about that.


I first noticed Bemis years ago under his old name, when RfM was rife with "just so" thinking. Brian M, if you are motivated to continue thinking about the ideas you've been touching on here at RfM, it's a good idea to follow up on Henry's recommendation. I hope to read more about your thoughts and experiences as you recover from Mormonism. Here's Henry's Sober recommendation (particularly chapter 7):

http://www.amazon.com/Philosophy-Biology-2nd-Edition-Dimensions/dp/0813391261/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1335622475&sr=1-1

Here are a few video clips of Elliott Sober:


http://youtu.be/sM_RrHuCSmU

This video titled "Darwin Day 2011 Philosophy of Evolution" is a good, general account of himself, his interests and his work. (I particularly enjoyed his criticism of the misuse of the *principle in logic*, Occam's Razor, in Science. Another abuse that littered RfM years ago.)


http://youtu.be/bU1ri-ZnYiA

This video titled "Elliot Sober, Darwin's universal impact…" is Sober speaking first at the 2009 Cambridge University symposium on Darwin's impact on our world today. (I particularly liked that he ends his talk with this witty bit from Nobel Prize winning Biologist Jacques Monod: "…any confusion between the ideas suggested by science and science itself must be carefully avoided." More than a bon mot, that should be front and centre for ANYONE either doing science or thinking about Science.)

Anyway, Brian M, I enjoyed your posts and especially the responses you elicited.

Human

Before a few of the more scientific posters opine about the relative insignificance of philosophy to science, consider John Gray's critique of Jonathan Haidt's new book:

http://www.tnr.com/article/books-and-arts/magazine/102760/righteous-mind-haidt-morality-politics-scientism

Snippet:


***IT IS RATHER LATE in his argument that Haidt offers anything like a definition of morality, but when he does it is avowedly functionalist: “Moral systems are interlocking sets of values, virtues, norms, practices, identities, institutions, technologies, and evolved psychological mechanisms that work together to suppress or regulate self-interest and make cooperative societies possible.” Haidt recognizes that this is an entirely descriptive definition. He acknowledges that, if it were applied normatively, “it would give high marks to fascist and communist societies as well as to cults, so long as they achieved high levels of social cooperation by creating a shared social order.”

That is an implication of Haidt’s analysis about which he should be seriously concerned. But Haidt seems not to grasp the depth of the difficulties that he faces. There is a slippage from “is” to “ought” in nearly all evolutionary theorizing, with arguments about natural behavior sliding into claims about the human good.***


The question-begging slippage from "Is" to "Ought" seems rampant (and dangerous) in the pop-science literature of the moment.

But here's a more glaring example of why scientists *ought* to know a little more philosophy:


***When Haidt considers what the normative element in morality should be, his conclusion is simple-minded to an extraordinary degree: “When we talk about making laws and implementing public policies in Western democracies that contain some degree of ethnic and moral diversity, then I think there is no compelling alternative to utilitarianism.” There is no sign that he is aware of the difficulties of utilitarianism as a moral theory. He cites Isaiah Berlin’s defense of pluralism in ethics without seeming to grasp that, if true, this pluralism was fatal to utilitarianism (as Berlin intended it to be).

Haidt assumes a connection between utilitarianism and the values of liberal democracy that dissolves with a moment’s critical reflection. Jeremy Bentham, the founder of modern utilitarianism, believed that utilitarian ethics applied universally, and advocated enlightened despotism throughout much of the world. Haidt’s belief that utilitarianism offers an effective way of making public policy in ethnically and morally diverse societies is equally unfounded. One of the problems of morally diverse societies is that utilitarian understandings of harm may not be widely enough shared to form an agreed basis for public policies. This is nowhere more clearly true than in the United States.***


And then a bit later, Gray points out how Haidt seems unaware "that intuitionism and utilitarianism are rivals, and not only in moral philosophy. They are also at odds in practice."

I should slow down right here and make it clear that Haidt isn't writing anything like the bullshit Sam Harris is writing on morality. His work is serious and warrants his good reputation. But his work also exemplifies the *utility*, dare I say, of scientists knowing philosophy a little better.

A lot of Gray's article goes to Bemis's point about evolutionary psychologists being too ready to reduce Humanity to an abstract theory or a set of principles. The old joke will always apply: there really isn't a such a thing as 2.2 kids.

Human

Human, a much appreciated analysis and corrective. I also see a problem with utilitarianism. It ignores minority needs and rights, something we try to address in a republican (small "r") democracy.

The genius of small "r" republicanism is that it enshrines both not laws themselves but what laws *cannot* be made, and a declaration of Universal, *inalienable* rights.

God Save America

Human

I've wondered, passingly, a similar thing about Occam's Razor. On logic, I've often thought some people try to argue from logic as a substitute for having sufficient facts, if that makes sense.

That makes a lot of sense, Robert, at least to me. Indeed, as Haidt has it, "...the worship of reason, which is sometimes found in philosophical and scientific circles, is a delusion. It is an example of faith in something that does not exist." God knows during the nineties I did my upmost best to get a few of Rand's Objectivists to understand something as simple and self-evident as that. Their "reason" always seemed to get in the way of observing simple, obvious things.

The 'Occam's Razor' fad drove me crazy. For one, I knew well the context of William the Fransciscan's meaning, having to butt my too Platonic head against his Nominalism during a crazy, heady time in my life (thanks to Copelston). For another, seriously, upon what premise can we assume that Nature, let alone the *Universe*, is necessarily logical, and parsimoniously so at that? As Sober observes, it serves us well methodologically; but as an assumption about ultimate reality? Silly.

On the one hand, logic and reason is nothing more than a description of our intutitions. Humans have been endowed with certain cognitive attributes, some of which can be generalized in the form of logical principles. A book on informal logic does little more than outline these principles. One might question whether and to what extent such principles have objective reality, and more importantly, whether they are all inclusive, as "tools" to ascertain truth.

On the other hand, the ability to reason, however such capacity may be limited, is all we have to ascertain truth about the world, i.e. to try to make sense of our perceptions, thoughts and feelings. Like it or not, this is our cognitive heritage. Even when we make aesthetic judgments, or interpret "spiritual" experiences, our cogntive capacities are required as we reason from our perceptions to generalizations about the world.

Philosophy can provide important insight in both understanding and applying this tool. It is true that people sometimes engage in "scientism," where they think that science is the only reliable vehicle to ascertain truth. Although this assumption is blatantly false, it is not false, in my view, to assume that human cognition, and the logic it entails, IS necessary for such determinations.

As a graduate student in philosophy at the University of Arizona in the early 1980s, I was in a class taught by a nationally distinquished professor-philosopher. (I don’t remember the subject) The professor casually invoked “Occam’s Razor” as a partial justification for particular philosophical position. In response, raised my hand and asked, "What principle of logic supported the conclusion that a simple theory is more likely to be true than a complex theory." His answer was something to the effect that “Nature prefers simplicity.” I then asked for the evidence supporting that principle. As you might imagine, he simply got annoyed and moved on.

It is absolutely astonishing to me how often highly qualified and sometimes renown philosophers and scientists of all stripes invoke Ockham’s Razor or parsimony to bootstrap otherwise inadequate, or poorly crafted theories or explanations. Then, this "principle" is repeated and spread like a “meme virus” throughout the scientific literature. It is never the main argument, but always a final "by-the-way" thought, that is supposed to bear some logical significance. (One often finds it repeated on this Board)

The suggestion underlying Ockham's razor is that there must be some probability calculus such that simple theories turn out to be more likely true than more complex theories when considering the application of such theories to nature. When one understands the "likelihood principle" as an extension of probability theory, and Bayes’ theorem, one can easily see that such an assumption is based upon assumed prior probabilities that are unsupported by correct probabilistic inference. (See Sober, “Let’s Razor Ockham’s Razor,” in Dudley Knowles Ed., Explanation and Its Limits) So, when you are reading a book and come across an appeal to Ockham’s Razor, hold on to your intellectual wallet!

However, as you note, it is a perfectly legitimate methodological stance, since simple theories are generally more easily tested experimentally, and more easily modeled.

When talking about the Razor, I always like to point people to the original quotes from William himself.

I think OR is a very useful guideline when comparing two explanations for 1 set of facts, but as you say, it is not, and should not be treated as a statement about the ultimate nature of reality. (I personally don't think anyone has the goods on that...otherwise we would have unified physics already).



Edited 1 time(s). Last edit at 05/05/2012 12:29PM by archytas.