Posted by:
Henry Bemis
(
)
Date: April 26, 2022 11:47AM
“What’s the source of your Doxastic voluntarism, a position often associated with theists? I’ve seen you self identify as an atheist. Do you really think you could simply choose to be a theist tomorrow if you wanted to?”
COMMENT: First a bit of introduction for the uninitiated. Doxastic voluntarism (the philosophical position that we can control our beliefs by our will) comes in two flavors, direct and indirect. Essentially, direct Doxastic voluntarism (DDV) is the claim that we can 'decide' what we want to believe, even if we otherwise know, or have reason to believe, that it is false. This is like Pascal's wager, where we are instructed to will a belief in God, regardless of our mental inclinations as to the falsity of such a belief. Indirect Doxastic voluntarism (IDV) claims that although we may not be able to will our beliefs directly, we can will our direction, focus, and/or attention toward facts that support a given belief, while avoiding facts that undermine such a belief. In that indirect sense, we can will our beliefs. Thus, a Mormon can indirectly will belief in Mormonism despite doubts, by focusing on facts that support such a belief while avoiding facts that do not. In either case, DDV or IDV, the will instantiates a given belief. Here is a good summary:
https://iep.utm.edu/doxastic-voluntarism/Now, my response to your objections. This response is based upon my metaphysical commitment to human beings as autonomous agents having free will. I will not argue that point here.
First, whether DDV or IDV is possible, or applicable, depends crucially on the contest. Moreover, we have to know or assume something about human nature; namely that humans are truth-interested and fact-interested creatures. Facts and truth matters. Moreover, we must assume that there are such facts and there are such truths as related to the world and reality generally.
We are constantly bombarded with ‘facts’ in the form personal experience, as well as in the form of ‘truth-claims’ from a wide variety of sources and as related to a wide variety of subjects. As truth-interested and fact-interested organisms, we assess such claims, and decide whether they are to be believed or disbelieved. Now, here is the important point: With all such facts there are degrees of psychological certainty and uncertainty which weigh in that decision. Some facts, for example, our subjective experience of our existence, are certain (I think, therefore I am!) These kind of facts are ‘forced upon us’ by their high degree of certainty. As such we are often ‘compelled’ to believe them. In such cases contrary beliefs as formed through DDV or IDV are difficult, if not impossible.
In other cases, however, windows of uncertainty (however wide or narrow) create an opportunity for the operation of the will as to the fixation of such beliefs (or disbeliefs). It is here that both DDV and IDV play important roles. To illustrate, there is no doubt that many believing Mormons know as much about the adverse facts of Mormonism as we do. Moreover, such people are equally competent at cognitive reasoning and critical thinking. What has happened is that they have focused on a sliver of uncertainty and thereby willed to believe in Mormonism in spite of such facts. Thus, where you have been ‘compelled’ to disbelieve, they have not. Why? because of DDV or IDV. Thus, in that sense, “People choose what to believe and not believe.” It does not mean that facts and truth are irrelevant to such choices, or that high degrees of certainty do not in some important sense ‘compel’ belief formation.
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“Of course we can choose to take a line of action that *may* lead to a change of belief, but that’s something different. The bottom line: I could no more choose to believe that stealing, rape and murder are good than I could choose to disbelieve that Homer was worthwhile reading for me.”
COMMENT: See above. “Taking a line of action that ‘may’ lead to a change of belief’ is by definition IDV. As such, your will remains in tact. Moral facts operation in the same way. In some contexts they seem certain, and thus seem to compel a certain action or inaction. In other cases, it is more ambiguous, and we have to choose where the moral line lies.
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“On the other note, I TRIED HARD to believe in Mormonism. I didn’t want to leave. I had three small kids, a Mormon wife, a large extended Mormon family that I fit in with very well; I also was young and just getting started and had some financial considerations to factor in. I did not want to apostatize. I tried to choose belief, but I just couldn’t believe. It wasn’t subject to my will. Of course I could have chosen to dissemble, to fake it, was even in the last moments counselled to do so. But actual belief I could not choose, anymore than I could choose to believe in Santa Claus.”
COMMENT: This, of course, is a common story. It points to your commitment to facts and truth, and in the present context, an unwillingness to amplify the small degree of uncertainty that might remain and desperately jump through it. For me that is character! Whether by deliberate, willed action, you (or I) could have changed our course and ‘willed’ (IDV) belief back again, is perhaps an open question, but for me, I doubt it. I feel just like you, that the facts and truth were sufficiently certain that I felt compelled to disbelieve. But that is not an abrogation of free will.