I am just starting Timothy Snyder's "The Road to Unfreedom".

He makes the observation,

"The Soviet Union that expelled Ilyin and educated Putin had a troubled relationship with time. It lacked a succession principle and lasted only sixty-nine years. The Bolsheviks were not concerned about succession because they believed that they were beginning a global revolution, not creating a state. The Russian Revolution of 1917 was for the world, a stroke of lightening to set civilization aflame, to start history anew. When this prophecy failed, the Bolsheviks had no choice but to establish a state on the territories they controlled; a new regime, which the called they Soviet Union."

As a consequence, the USSR did not have an established succession principle for national leadership and has suffered ever since.

Of course, this applies equally as well to the American Revolution. Washington, Adams, and the rest didn't start with a plan to put together a country organized under the rules of the Constitution. That happened years later, only after failure and the threat of collapse pushed them to it. Nevertheless, for Russia and the U.S., our myths of nationhood are built on the "purity" of the original generative struggle, not on the pragmatic compromise of politics that is actually responsible for the formation of our countries. That is seen somehow as dirty and corrupt.

And too, this also applies to the formation of the Christian church (and the LDS church). The organization of the political structure occurred after the excitement and thrill of the creation was gone, and people had to figure out the next chapter on their own. I don't think that Jesus had any plan for a new "church." I think he wanted to change people, to light a torch, not to establish codes, by-laws, offices, and job descriptions. It was only after he was gone that people, once they stopped expecting him to soon return, had to figure out how to get to the next step and preserve the sanctity of the dream in a dreary and nasty world.

For the American Founding Fathers, for their new country they turned to the old examples they knew best - parlimentarian democracy seasoned with Age of Reason insights. The early Fathers of the Church turned to what was familiar and effective - Roman courts and law. For Mormons, it was a stew of nineteenth century manias and fads.

Interesting analysis, most or which makes sense to me. I differ in a few minor respects but imagine the author may address some of these in the bulk of the book.

The first point is that while the Bolsheviks did expect their revolution to spread around the world almost instantaneously and hence thought that there was no need for an administrative state, by 1922 they realized that that would not happen and that in order to preserve their accomplishment they needed to create a real government. The result was the doctrine of "socialism in one country," which acknowledged the lack of a global revolution and set about creating permanent armed forces and other things necessary to sustain the polity indefinitely.

But that state apparatus did not result in a stable succession mechanism, and that fact suggests that you need more than an administrative state and even a constitution. (Cue recent American events, which show that a constitution is but a piece of paper if enough citizens decide to overthrow it.).

I propose that you need a culture of succession, meaning a mechanism plus a political culture that expects and demands that those rules be enforced. Viewed from that perspective, the reason--or one of the important reasons--that the American colonists succeeded in establishing a dependable succession mechanism was the British legacy. For it was the Brits who established the institutions of American government, the rule of law, parliamentary conventions, etc., and ran the country that way for so long that the ideas became imprinted on American consciousness. The USSR, by contrast, had a constitution and a succession mechanism but did not have the underlying political culture. That's why the constitution in that country was never more than a piece of paper.

Ultimately republican government depends on popular support. The USSR, China, and Russia had republican constitutions but the trees did not put down roots in political culture. Conversely, a strong political culture in support of a republican government can for various reasons turn hostile--as happened in Weimar Germany and more recently in the United States. At times like those, it takes strong leadership and heavy lifting to prevent the waves of populist nihilism from undermining the democratic republic to the extent that it collapses.

Keep us posted on this book? It sounds intriguing.

Lot's Wife Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> Interesting analysis, most or which makes sense to
> me. I differ in a few minor respects but imagine
> the author may address some of these in the bulk
> of the book.
>
> The first point is that while the Bolsheviks did
> expect their revolution to spread around the world
> almost instantaneously and hence thought that
> there was no need for an administrative state, by
> 1922 they realized that that would not happen and
> that in order to preserve their accomplishment
> they needed to create a real government.

They had state apparatus around long before then. The military units would be the most obvious aspects of this, as they went around terrorizing the general population, seizing their property & food supplies and telling them Marxism was the only show in town.

They did have some successes. There was a revolution in Hungary under Bela Kun, and a less successful attempt in Germany, which culminated in their use as scapegoats by the National Socialists. There was even a couple of brief lived attempts to set up a Marxist state in Ireland.

1921 proved that the Bolsheviks despised the working man. As the deprogrammed Communist Arthur Koestler wrote, "Every socialist has their Kronstadt". The system's inability to feed its own people came to a head when Lenin crushed a rebellion led by REAL peasants and industrial workers. Around the same time, Lenin abandoned failed Marxist principles and introduced the New Economic Policy.

Whoosh.

What the Bolsheviks had running around terrorizing and plundering the people from 1917 to 1922 were not "state apparatus" at all. They were armed gangs working for a disorganized and brutal ruling party intent on getting rich so it could complete the global revolution and the state could wither away to nothing--as per Marx. Those criminal gangs were not the institutions of a stable state or government.

As for Bela Kun and Rosa Luxemburg, I alluded to them but you apparently didn't notice. What I said was "by 1922 they realized that [a global revolution] would not happen." Why did I say 1922? Because that was when the Hungarian, German, and other attempts to foment foreign communist revolutions had all failed.

It was then that the Bolsheviks announced their new strategy of socialism in one country and started building the institutions of state necessary to sustain Russia/USSR indefinitely in a hostile world. You indirectly admit that when you say that it was in 1922 that "Lenin abandoned failed Marxist principles and introduced the New Economic Policy."

That, I reiterate, was what I said above. In 1922 the Bolsheviks started building a long-term government. You have added nothing to that argument.

Interesting. Thanks for your comment Chorey.

Regarding governments, when I factor in the fact that "Everybody lies!" all I have left are dubious labels and the best-sounding rhetoric.

...Leaving me with a realization that I'm usually voting for the person who promises that he or she will take better care of me at the lowest possible price and not mess with whatever advantages I currently enjoy.

I vote for myself, not to take care of others.



Actually, I'm a terrible citizen.  I've got a bit over a year to decide between my two leading candidates in terms of who to write in on my presidential ballot.  The last time I marked a presidential ballot, it was for Richard M. Nixon.  He won!!!  Obviously, I can no longer be trusted.  So, writing in a name gets me points with that person and lessens the harm I might do to our country.  

Hey, maybe I am a good citizen, in the long run?

And where's Harold Stassen when we need him?

My reason in posting was not to make so much a political statement (as I think everything is political anyway), but to make comparisons of the evolution of organizations. I cannot think of any historical example where somebody said, "We've come up with a plan to organize ourselves along philosophical principles, now all we need to do is implement it," and then successfully done it. More commonly, people act and then try to make sense of their actions or justify them later.

Mormons like to think that they are different, special, but their history follows the patterns of many other groups, including Sovietism.

I think this also supports the argument that Jesus did not established a church, and that no church can rightfully claim to be "his" church. It was a creation after the act.

You can go further with that analysis.

The degree to which a new institution survives depends on whether it fits the pre-existing political culture. I cited the examples of the US system working because the colonists shared a culture of parliamentary government and rule of law and hence were prepared to accept a republican constitution. By contrast, the institutions and constitutions newly established during and after the French Revolution failed because there was no supporting cultural infrastructure: only the traditions of a hated monarchy. We therefore shouldn't be surprised to see the early fumblings towards representative government collapse in the face of Jacobin terrorism and then Napoleonic dictatorship, which better fit France's authoritarian political culture.

The political scientist Samuel Huntington showed, among other things, that when there is a dominant religion at play the stability of a government depends on whether it accords with that religious culture. Joining Toqueville, he contended that pluralistic Protestantism is more compatible with democratic republican government while Catholicism tends to reinforce authoritarian governments. If you were to look around the world, you see that that is generally true: Catholic countries tend to have relatively dictatorial political systems.

The Mormon case is interesting because in some ways it fits the pattern and in some it does not. Smith's largely Protestant environment supported the sort of egalitarianism that informed Mormonism through about 1838, but then the faith turned increasingly authoritarian and dictatorial. We know that some Saints found this unacceptable and started to peel off from the LDS community; the attacks on non-Mormons and the destruction of the printing press were things that appalled conventional Mormons and their American contemporaries and hence caused lots of trouble.

Perhaps the reason the LDS church survived that progressively more intense "democratic" challenge was the removal to Utah, where the community was isolated and BY was powerful enough to create a more authoritarian political culture. It was, after all, from the middle 1840s to the early 20th century that a uniquely Mormon lifestyle took hold, one that coincided with the church's preferred hierarchical and dictatorial habits of governance.

I would argue what has happened in the last fifty or so years is that younger generations of Mormons have gravitated away from that dictatorial culture and embraced the American lifestyle promoted most recently by the internet and the ready availability of information. Today's young Mormons now look at the church leadership and laugh as they walk away. In institutional terms, the younger generations no longer share the old respect for authority, which is probably also true of younger Americans in general.

I doubt that the proposition that American culture has moved away from the LDS governance model--which is what I am arguing in a nutshell--would surprise anyone.

“Every great cause begins as a movement, becomes a business, and eventually degenerates into a racket.” (Eric Hoffer)

Did Mr. Hoffer mention how *Family* fits into that equation?

I suppose we'd agree that different *Families* might clash as they sought different goals.

But there is the currently very illusive prospect of *The Family of Man.*


Yeah...I'm a sucker for a happy ending.

caffiend Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> “Every great cause begins as a movement, becomes
> a business, and eventually degenerates into a
> racket.” (Eric Hoffer)

Some not-so-great causes as well.

@ Lot's Wife.

Agree completely.

I'll add though, that there can be undercurrents in the "pre-existing political culture" that nurture (and perhaps even obscure) more radical deviations hiding in the dominate culture. I think this is what we are seeing in the US at the moment. We have a bunch of political party regulars and an established platform, and then along comes somebody who is able to quickly capitalize on fears and emotions that have been fermenting for years. The old order is upended.

Likewise, I think early Mormonism built on the egalitarianism and anti-establishment elements in place in the early 19th century, but I would argue that the turn towards authoritarianism was an undercurrent in the US at that time as well. There were a number of groups of the Millennialism period and most of them formed around a single, charismatic leader. The growing western frontier was scattered with people trying to make their own fortunes and also create new empires. There is a magnetic, intoxicating attraction to great movements (or what is thought to be "great") for people who feel that their lives need more meaning and purpose.

This might even be ingrained into the American psyche. "When totalitarianism comes, it will be wrapped in the flag and carrying the Bible." (ascribed to various sources)

This is a rich post; for which, thank you.


-------------------
> I'll add though, that there can be undercurrents
> in the "pre-existing political culture" that
> nurture (and perhaps even obscure) more radical
> deviations hiding in the dominate culture.

With a tip of the bonnet to Mr. Bell Curve, or his more humble (???) local representative, all of my thought is provisional. Countries may have a tendency, a predisposition towards a certain type of political organization, but events often overturn that organization for short periods of time or even permanently. So inherent in any democracy is the danger that it will be overthrown.

There are many people who have made that observation with particular reference to the US. In the early 1830s Toqueville, that great observer and proponent of American democracy, said that if that the republic failed it would be because a group that gained power legitimately then used its dominance to rip out the constitutional rules protecting the minority. Huey Long said much the same, that if tyranny came to the US it would be in the form of a populist claiming to represent the majority.

The other interesting point is that democracy itself is an unnatural system, meaning that it only works when people are well-behaved and willing to live in a world of compromise, never getting what they really want. And if you turn up the pressure through economic trouble, civil war or foreign war, anything that terrifies enough people, they will loose their patience with the uncertainties of democracy and look for a more decisive alternative in some permutation of a dictatorship. History is full of such cases.

So yes, any democracy has undercurrents of potential change. It would be naive to think countries that achieve republican forms of government are "permanent." They require work, and history is littered with the detritus of abandoned constitutional republics.


---------------
I think
> this is what we are seeing in the US at the
> moment. We have a bunch of political party
> regulars and an established platform, and then
> along comes somebody who is able to quickly
> capitalize on fears and emotions that have been
> fermenting for years. The old order is upended.

Yes, and I've already intimated that I think the vulnerability opened through the piecemeal deconstruction of the social safety net, decades of adverse economic trends (globalization) and misfortunes (serial financial crisis that ruined scores of millions of Americans' lives) and adverse social trends (enormous growth in the disparity in income and wealth). People grew anxious, angry, impatient with the norms of constitutional government, and threw their weight behind a nihilist force that cared little for republican niceties like the separation of powers and checks and balances.

It's just the latest in a long, long line of endangered or fallen democracies.


----------------
> Likewise, I think early Mormonism built on the
> egalitarianism and anti-establishment elements in
> place in the early 19th century, but I would argue
> that the turn towards authoritarianism was an
> undercurrent in the US at that time as well. There
> were a number of groups of the Millennialism
> period and most of them formed around a single,
> charismatic leader. The growing western frontier
> was scattered with people trying to make their own
> fortunes and also create new empires. There is a
> magnetic, intoxicating attraction to great
> movements (or what is thought to be "great") for
> people who feel that their lives need more meaning
> and purpose.

Agreed. I'd venture that the frontier folk were by definition not steeped in the genteel and educated culture of the East Coast; in fact many of them, particularly the religious, were trying to escape the "establishment" much as their Protestant forefathers had sought the same generations before. And frontier life was rough, unstable, dangerous, so that too would incline a lot of people towards more extreme political and religious movements that offered easy solutions.


--------------------
> This might even be ingrained into the American
> psyche. "When totalitarianism comes, it will be
> wrapped in the flag and carrying the Bible."
> (ascribed to various sources)

Doesn't the presidency of Andrew Jackson bear that out? He was a proto-dictatorial ruler elected at the same time that all the revivalist stuff was happening along the New England Frontier; in fact, I suspect that Jackson may have been a model for Captain Moroni, the swashbuckling (without the buckle, of course, given Native American technology) general who swept into the halls of power and tossed out all the morally compromised . . . compromisers.

There is a strong familial resemblance between Joseph Smith's time and the present.

This post I liked a lot.

Especially: "For Mormons, it was a stew of nineteenth century manias and fads." Those words are, as they say, a whole lot bigger than the sum of their parts.


I would be likely to re-title the book "Flying by the Seat of Your Pants" as that is what I see in the OP. With the subtitle being "taking off with out a destination in mind fueled by a need to be in control for self supposed valiant reasons or simply to assert one's own superiority".

Reminds me how lucky I have been going through life with out a plan. Lots of dreams and good intentions though and a need to "make it". Could have gone south very quickly but somehow all worked out---so far.

I'm not one of the intellectuals or historians here but loved this thread. Thank you.

> I'm not one of the
> intellectuals or
> historians here but
> loved this thread.


Yes, we are a startling bunch of ineffectuals!  Learn to play with a poker face, keep your cards close to the vest and you, too, can become an RfM ineffectual!