Posted by:
caffiend
(
)
Date: August 28, 2021 10:53PM
From the Aug 25 WSJ, this fascinating article on how the Taliban's economic policies advanced their political power, all undergirded by high-demand religious practices. The article mentions LDS, showing that highly conspicuous religious conformity reinforces obedience and identifies loyal followers who can be groomed for leadership.
To condense the article, and respect the WSJ's copyright, I have edited it (...) to those sections that are especially germane to LDS. As you read it, think: "Brigham Young, with keen despotic instincts, in a large semi-arid geography, governing a struggling people, seeking to consolidate his power and unify them, contesting against a powerful external adversary, developing high-demand religious practices."
I interjected a few remarks as "-Ed."
* * * * *
...How could a ragtag group of religious fundamentalists be so effective in capturing a territory that has resisted rule by some of the most formidable world powers?
An answer can be found in a quirky academic subfield known as the political economy of religion. It was developed in the late 1980s by sociologists Rodney Stark and Roger Finke and economist Laurence Iannaccone...
An insight from Mr. Iannaccone bears directly on the success of the Taliban: Groups with strict behavioral rituals are especially effective at organizing collective action. He was intrigued by the organizational vibrancy of some of the strictest faiths in the U.S., including Mormons, Jehovah’s Witnesses and Orthodox Jews [and Amish (-Ed.)] These groups all have demanding behavioral codes and intensely devoted adherents.
Mr. Iannaccone argued that behavioral codes like a prohibition on alcohol and stigmatizing behavior like wearing distinctive clothing enhanced cooperation. Religious organizations are “club goods,” wherein members share many collective benefits such as welfare provision and fellowship. Those benefits depend on active contribution. If everyone participates willingly, the organization is vibrant...
To limit free riding, strict religious groups require members to prove their loyalty [and obedience (-Ed)] via costly and visible behavior that deters the lazy [and non-believing (-Ed.)], such as going on two-year missions or memorizing holy texts. Such “sacrificial signaling” can be seen in other groups, such as fraternities and street gangs with strange hazing rituals.
Stigmatizing behavior also limits the outside opportunities of group members and binds (believers) more closely to the organization. Members find it difficult to betray the group because they have few alternative social options.
Economist Eli Berman used Mr. Iannaccone’s insight to study terrorist and rebel organizations. In his 2009 book “Radical, Religious and Violent,” Mr. Berman explained that operating a rebel group requires a high degree of loyal cooperation...
Linking a strict religious sect to a radical rebel group is an effective way of enhancing loyalty and cooperation. People who keep strict dietary habits, pray publicly several times a day, write poetry, and study religious texts to the exclusion of other activities make good cooperators.
The Taliban are an excellent example of Mr. Berman’s thesis. Their fundamentalist version of Sunni Islam imposes strict requirements on all members. It is easy for them to identify and choose leaders who are the most cooperative and know that they can be trusted [to obey and (-ed)] not to defect. As a result, they have become a disciplined organization wherein leaders and lower-level militants are unlikely to defect from the group’s mission of creating an Islamic state.
That explained their rise to power in Afghanistan in the 1990s. Following the withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1989, Afghanistan collapsed into a disorganized mess of rival clans vying for political and economic power. A disunited governing system couldn’t effectively collect taxes. The nation’s infrastructure, including the ability to guarantee basic market interactions, fell into disrepair.
The Taliban was the only unifying entity that could guarantee safe trade routes, collect taxes without excessively plundering the population, and provide essential public goods to key cities. They did this initially by securing control of the Kandahar-Herat Highway, an important trade route between Pakistan and Iran. Previously, competing tribal organizations dominated sections of this highway, stopped all transit, and excessively taxed truckers. With many different clans extracting money every few miles, it became too expensive to transport goods along this road, and commerce ground to a halt.
The Taliban eventually stationed militants at key locations on the highway and taxed merchants only once while protecting truckers from other bandits. Since devout Taliban members proved their loyalty via adherence to strict religious codes, the]y were unlikely to plunder the trucking caravans further, allowing commercial transport to resume.
[Compare to "the Kingdom of Deseret" and its position vz. trans-continental traffic and trade.
Successfully securing this road, the Taliban collected tolerable taxes they used for infrastructure projects throughout the country. The Taliban became reasonably popular. Afghans might not have liked their repressive religious policies, but at least the roads were open and the electricity came back.
[People will sacrifice their autonomy (liberty) in exchange for stability and safety. --Ed.]
The Taliban also proved to be reasonably fair arbitrators of civil justice, as imams adjudicated contract disputes between merchants. If people trust that property rights can be fairly enforced, they are more likely to make long-term investments that promote economic growth...
All this was possible because the Taliban are a strict religious movement in which leaders and members prove their loyalty by adhering to strict behavioral requirements. The secular government lacked this advantage. Little wonder that when the Taliban rolled into a town, the local population usually put up little resistance. For many Afghans, the strict and predictable implementation of Shariah is preferable to the arbitrary and kleptocratic rule that Afghans have endured for two decades...
[Brutal enforcement surely helped. (-Ed.)]
Despite the seeming irrelevance of religion in the secular West, policy makers and military strategists would do well to understand its power elsewhere in the world.
Mr. Gill is a professor of political science at the University of Washington and author of “The Political Origins of Religious Liberty” (Cambridge University Press).
Edited 1 time(s). Last edit at 08/28/2021 11:09PM by caffiend.